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Chapter 1

Consumer Protection
in an Era of Globalization
Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, and David Zaring

Society has long tolerated some risk in the products consumers buy,
especially when the risks are understood to be inherent in the products’
use. By their very nature, for example, cigarettes and fat-laden desserts
pose risks to consumers, and, although some car models may be more
crashworthy than others, driving any automobile introduces a degree
of risk. But when two identical products sit side by side on a shelf, and
one of them might be deadly and the other benign, we have a recipe for
serious public health problems as well as major economic consequences
from diminishing consumer trust.
The problem of unsafe food, pharmaceuticals, and consumer products coexisting with goods the public assumes to be safe has recently
become more acute as a consequence of the boom in global trade.
For example, in the span of just two recent years, consumers in a number of countries have endured a series of health crises from products
imported from China:
•

•

In 2006, Panama imported from China syrup for cough medicine
that contained diethylene glycol—a chemical compound used in
antifreeze—instead of glycerin. More than 250,000 bottles of cold
medicine were manufactured from the toxic syrup, which fatally poisoned more than 100 people (Bogdanich and Koster 2008). The
same poisonous ingredient also made its way into more than 6,000
imported tubes of toothpaste sold in Panama in 2007 (Bogdanich
and McLean 2007).
Multinational toy manufacturers recalled tens of millions of toys in
2007 in response to the discovery of lead paint or unsafe magnetic
parts on many popular toys—from Barbie to Thomas the Tank Engine—that were produced in China and sold worldwide (Story 2007).
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•

•

•

•

A toy product manufactured in China and marketed in the United
States as “Aqua Dots” and in Australia as “Bindeez” was found in
2007 to contain beads manufactured with a glue that, when ingested,
converted to an analog of the so-called date rape drug, putting at
least several children into comas (Bradsher 2007).
In 2008, milk and milk products from China, including infant formula, were found to contain melamine, a chemical used as a fire retardant that had been illegally added as a thickening agent to increase
and mask the protein content of diluted milk. Melamine contamination led to hundreds of thousands of illnesses and numerous deaths
in China, as well as to massive product recalls throughout Asia, the
Americas, and Europe (Oster et al. 2008). A similar scare in 2007 involved imported pet food contaminated with melamine (Nestle 2008).
Nearly 150 deaths have occurred globally from the contamination
of Chinese-manufactured heparin, a blood thinner used for patients
undergoing certain types of kidney dialysis and cardiovascular surgeries (Powell 2008). The heparin manufactured in China was found
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to contain a lowercost substance—oversulfated chondroitin sulfate—that mimics the
anticoagulant effects of pure heparin but may have lethal side effects
(Powell 2008).
An estimated 100,000 homes throughout the United States may contain Chinese-manufactured drywall linked to indoor air pollution—
specifically “rotten egg” odors—and to the corrosion of copper
piping and air-conditioner coils (CPSC 2009; Lee and Semuels 2009;
Schmit 2009). Residents and public health officials are concerned
about eye, skin, and respiratory irritation, as well as other health and
safety risks, including the possibility of fire or shock from corroded
piping and wiring.

China is not the only source of alarm about unsafe products. Government officials around the world have raised safety concerns about products imported from other countries. In 2008, for example, the U.S. FDA
barred for safety reasons the importation of more than thirty generic
drugs produced by Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., an Indian pharmaceutical manufacturer (Dooren and Favole 2009).
The need to protect consumers from unsafe food, drugs, and other
products is a persistent one—and is certainly not limited to imported
products. As with the Chinese deaths resulting from the recent melamine
contamination of milk products, the citizens of the countries that export
unsafe products can be just as much affected as those in the importing
country (Powell 2008). Moreover, national regulatory apparatuses for
monitoring domestic producers have been in place around the world for
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most of the last century to address the same kind of risks that arise from
unsafe imports (Vogel 2007). Even in developed countries with longstanding regulatory regimes, domestic products can be as dangerous as
any import (Moss and Martin 2009). The same market pressures and
consumer demands for cheap goods that may lead some producers to cut
corners on safety apply whether products are made at home or abroad:
the expansive recall of peanut-based products throughout the United
States in early 2009, for example, targeted a Georgia-based processing
facility of the Peanut Corporation of America (Zhang 2009). When in
2007 the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
sought to recall defective tires manufactured in China (sold by the aptly
named Foreign Tire Sales), the underlying concern was not much different from when NHTSA took action in 2000 against the U.S.-based Fire
stone company for defective tires produced at a plant in Decatur, Illinois
(Aeppel 2007).
Nevertheless, the challenge of protecting consumers from unsafe
imports deserves special and intensive analysis at this time of expanding globalization. Not only are safety crises from imported products not
going to disappear, but they are likely to increase with international
trade. When the world recovers from its recent economic downturn,
the flow of goods moving across borders will continue to expand. Already the U.S. economy depends on more than $2 trillion worth of
imported goods per year, with more than half coming from Canada,
China, Mexico, Japan, and Germany (HHS 2007a). The sheer volume
of international trade creates a vast and complex network of the sources
of safety problems. More than 825,000 different exporting companies
bring products into the United States through more than 300 airports,
seaports, and border crossings (HHS 2007a), straining the capacity of
national regulatory authorities to inspect products at the borders and
monitor facilities at the site of manufacture.
The benefits of international trade are clear: the lowering of trade
barriers creates new market opportunities and enhances welfare by lowering costs to consumers. But global trade also contributes to added
vulnerabilities. The Indian pharmaceutical company cited by U.S. regulators in 2008 for safety problems was reportedly the sole source of
a key children’s antibiotic supplied to the New Zealand health system
(Das 2008). Even a country such as the United States, which has long
placed restrictions on the importation of drugs produced from outside
its borders (ostensibly for safety reasons), currently relies on imports
for more than 80 percent of the active pharmaceutical ingredients used
by its drug manufacturers (GAO 1998). In addition to the vulnerabilities citizens face from goods manufactured in parts of the world not
subject to their common “social contract,” the combination of global
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trade with modern technology’s constant innovation in manufacturing
techniques, product designs, and formulas makes the challenge all the
greater for the regulator of imported products. As Professor Li Shaomin has observed, “When millions of people experiment with new ways
to make money without moral self-constraint, the chance of new products that can evade existing testing methods is pretty high” (Xin and
Stone 2008: 1311).
The challenge of import safety calls for new policy ideas and analysis. The former U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Michael
Leavitt, noted that “ just as the volume of trade has changed, so must
the strategies to regulate safety. Simply scaling up our current inspection strategy will not work” (Leavitt 2008: 4).
This book is premised on the view that global trade poses both quantitatively and qualitatively distinct problems for consuming publics
around the globe and for those governments charged with protecting
them. Although consumers can be harmed just as much by domestic
products as by imports, the import safety problem raises a variety of
jurisdictional, legal, cultural, political, and practical issues that are not
present with domestic product regulation. The research in this book
casts a needed light on the distinct nature of the import safety problem,
analyzes a variety of innovative solutions to it, and addresses the implications these solutions hold for important social values, ranging from
accountability to efficiency.
This book also treats the problem as a general one confronting the
food industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and all other industries
that manufacture consumer products of all kinds, from tires to toys. In
much of the world, separate regulatory laws and institutions have been
created to deal with safety problems in different industries. Policy research has often tracked these divisions, with distinct communities of
experts focused on food safety, drug regulation, and consumer safety.
In editing this volume, we have certainly been mindful of these divisions of expertise, as well as of the varied industrial processes, economic
conditions, and sources of safety problems that exist across these domains. The contamination of food products from the E. coli bacterium
is obviously quite a different policy problem than the risks of tread separation in automobile tires. The risks to different subpopulations of the
public may also vary depending on the type of product, ranging from
children with toys to the elderly and immunocompromised populations
with pharmaceuticals. Yet, as much as we recognize these differences,
we also resist dividing the import safety issue into separate problems
of regulating the safety of imported food, drugs, and consumer products. Decision makers and analysts in each of these domains confront
the same fundamental policy choices and, broadly speaking, the same
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kinds of challenges. Those with a particular interest in one domain can
learn from the experiences in other domains and from efforts, such as
this book represents, to generalize across different domains.

The Import Safety Problem
We begin with a straightforward understanding of the problem of import safety. The ultimate concern is to avoid the adverse health effects
that arise from lapses in safe practices. Such lapses could arise from a
variety of possible sources, some intentional, others simply accidental.
The schematic shown in Figure 1 provides a highly simplified model
of the various links in the causal chain that leads to consumer harm
from imported products. At each step along the way there is the possibility for tampering and contamination—from the initial creation of
ingredients or other product inputs to the manufacturing, shipment,
and sale of the product. As the schematic shows, protecting import
safety requires oversight of a complex welter of inputs on both sides of
the border.
The actual causal chain for unsafe imports is much more complex.
Ingredient and input production is often undertaken by entities separate from those involved in manufacturing itself (Neef 2004). Con-
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sumer products can contain many components, drugs often include
numerous different ingredients, and food products comprise the outputs of numerous farmers and ranchers. Supply chains, especially in
countries as large as China, can be vast and complicated. The schematic in Figure 1 fails to represent this complexity. Furthermore, in
reality, the vertical jurisdictional line in the figure can be placed at
more than one step in the more complex chain that leads to real consumer harm. Manufacturing can even take place in the importing state,
with just product components imported. Large manufacturers and
large retail operations, such as “big box” stores, rely on many different sources around the world. As a result, the number of individuals
who could tamper with or contaminate a product can be quite substantial. For any given imported product, each step in the causal chain can
involve numerous different actors, each with their own incentives, constraints, knowledge, capacity, and motivations.
At some point from the initial ingredient production to the sale and
use by consumers, an imported product moves from one jurisdiction to
another. That movement over a jurisdictional border—from the exporting state to the importing one—qualitatively distinguishes the problem
of import safety from the “ordinary” problems all governments face in
policing the safety of food, drug, and consumer products within their
borders. What the dotted vertical line in Figure 1 represents is the qualitatively different problem of import safety, one that brings with it an
additional set of regulatory challenges. These challenges can be legal,
cultural, and even practical. Just identifying who manufactured an
ingredient can sometimes be difficult when records are kept in another
country and in another language. For example, in 2001 a pair of FDA
inspectors were reportedly unable to conduct an inspection of a Chinese facility producing acetaminophen imported into the United States
because they simply could not find where the facility was located (Harris 2008). Even when harm can be practically traced back to sources in
other countries, regulatory and legal liability may not extend overseas,
effectively giving importers a “free ride” on the harm that their products impose on consumers.
In addition to the challenges of monitoring and enforcing safety
abroad, international trade complicates consumer protection still further when nations exhibit different cultural postures toward risk and
place different domestic priorities on the use of government regulatory resources (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; GAO 2008b). Even if some
cross-cultural risk threshold exists above which no consumer should be
expected to suffer, it is still undoubtedly the case that the consuming
publics in wealthy importing nations will often have different expectations for safety than consumers in developing countries. Even wealthy
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publics in different parts of the world—Europe versus the United States,
for example—can differ in their perceptions of what product safety
means, both across countries and within them (Ansell and Vogel 2006;
Hanrahan 2001; Meijer and Stewart 2004). These differences factor not
only into differences in government-imposed safety standards, but also
into political and institutional choices about what types of domestic regulatory organizations to create and how to fund them, choices that are
affected by competing priorities for scarce government resources.

Policy Challenges
As with any regulatory problem, import safety can be addressed by
attending to the various links on the causal chain that lead to consumer
risk. Of course, if it were possible to test each and every individual pill,
product, or morsel of food just before it came into contact with the ultimate consumer, then in principle the regulator could address risk only
at that end point and not worry about the causal chain leading up to
it. But it is obviously impossible for any government to have the equivalent of a “royal taster” (or other inspector) to check each consumer’s
intake or purchase in advance. Moreover, import safety is simply not
an achievable goal absent some form of international cooperation or
interaction. If nothing else, it is that interaction, in the form of international trade, that gives rise to imports, and hence to the problem of
ensuring their safety. Because the traditional tools of domestic regulation cannot, alone, address the totality of the problem, any proposal
for innovative new protections must not only overcome domestic regulatory hurdles but also survive in the international environment as well.
It is possible, of course, to impose tort liability when consumers are
harmed by products, but such liability by itself will be insufficient for
several reasons. Although the threat of ex post imposition of liability
can create incentives for manufacturers to ensure safety ex ante (Moore
and Viscusi 2001), the incentives from tort liability are usually below
the socially optimal level because of the costs and practical difficulties in assigning responsibility when consumers are harmed. Consider
someone who gets sick or injured from a product with different components—say, even something as simple as a hamburger: it will often not
be possible to identify which specific component caused the problem.
Was it the meat, the bun, the ketchup, the pickles? Even if the specific
component can be identified, when supply chains are long and complex, with suppliers entering and exiting the market, it will often be difficult to trace back the source of the harm to hold the appropriate party
liable. Even if the retailer or manufacturer were to be held strictly liable for any harm from products within its purview, that still means that
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the direct incentives from such liability arise only after consumers have
been harmed—when the ideal objective would be to prevent such harm
from occurring in the first place (Bamberger and Guzman 2008). To
the extent that the decision makers at retail and manufacturing firms
underestimate the risk of being held liable, or to the extent that the
impact of tort liability is reduced to below the socially optimal level
because of the existence of insurance, the possibility of bankruptcy, or
the ability to negotiate damage awards downward, the need for preventive regulation remains.
Each of the various steps along the causal chain then becomes a potential target of regulatory intervention. At each of these steps, at least
three types of decisions about regulatory intervention must be made:
1. What is the appropriate level of safety to strive for? In other words,
how safe is safe enough (WTO 1998)?
2. What form should regulatory standards take? Regulators can specify
the end point to achieve by adopting performance standards (e.g.,
from general standards such as “drugs shall be safe” to specific standards such as “foods shall contain no more than 0.01 ppm [parts per
million] residues of each listed pesticide”). Another option would
be to impose requirements that firms adopt certain safety practices
or use specified technologies (“pasteurize milk to a temperature of
161 degrees Fahrenheit for at least two separate 15-second periods,”
or “keep fish refrigerated at or below 34 degrees Fahrenheit”). A still
further, more recent alternative would be to impose management
standards that essentially require firms to develop their own performance and technology standards (Coglianese and Lazer 2003).
3. How should compliance with the applicable standards be monitored
and enforced? Possibilities range from record-keeping and reporting requirements by businesses to inspections by third-party auditors or government officials.
To be sure, these decisions apply to the regulation of products produced domestically as well as to those imported from another country.
However, when regulation seeks to protect against harm experienced
in one country but caused by manufacturing and shipping practices in
another country, there will be jurisdictional choices.
One choice for the importing country might be simply to rely on the
exporting country to set the safety standards and to enforce them. Another choice for the importing nation is to screen products when they
cross the border and enter its jurisdiction—but then, since only the
product itself is observed, the only option available to the importing
nation is to apply performance standards and assess whether the prod-

Consumer Protection in an Era of Globalization     11

uct is unsafe, rather than dictating anything about how it was manufactured (Sullivan 2007). Of course, in an era of expanding global trade,
the task of inspecting and testing each product entering from international trade would be monumental, if not Sisyphean. Yet another option, then, would be for exporting and importing countries to share
regulatory responsibilities, cooperating in standard-setting, enforcement, or both. Importing and exporting countries could harmonize
their standards, or at least enter into mutual recognition treaties on
the substantive standards to apply to products available in both countries (Horton 1998; Merrill 1998; Nicolaïdis 1996; Shaffer 2002). They
could share enforcement intelligence and monitoring reports, or even
allow each other’s government inspectors to visit production plants inside the others’ borders. And, of course, they could also combine several of these or other approaches into a portfolio of interventions.
International cooperation over import safety poses important, even
at times novel, challenges. The challenges are greatest when the exporting and importing countries do not share the same substantive
safety standards. If the exporting country will accept foods that contain
higher pesticide levels, for example, to what extent should it be permissible for the importing country to enforce more stringent standards?
If such differences in standards grow out of real differences in risk tolerances, and are not just a cover for protectionism, they will be permissible under global rules, but nevertheless they might still affect the
willingness of an exporting country to engage in forms of regulatory
cooperation with an importing country.
In addition to bilateral regulatory cooperation between exporting
and importing countries, other institutional arrangements could involve the creation of transnational institutions that would possess standard-setting authority or enforcement powers (or both). Or perhaps
such arrangements could involve attempts to leverage private-sector
institutions to address product safety, either through greater reliance
on private standard-setting and auditing bodies, through trade associations, or even through large manufacturers or retailers that could
use their purchasing power to impose safety-related demands on their
suppliers.
In considering the appropriate form of intervention, a further question arises concerning the consequences that should be imposed on
those who violate safety standards. Some of these consequences may
be imposed by the marketplace itself. If Europeans want to avoid foods
with genetically modified organisms (GMOs), and they know that U.S.
foods have GMO ingredients, they may simply avoid buying foods produced in the United States. When it comes to nonmarket or government consequences, though, these can be blunt instruments, such as
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applying trade sanctions or product bans against the exporting country rather than specific manufacturers—effectively punishing responsible producers in the same industry from the same country along with
the offending manufacturers of the dangerous products. More specific
consequences might involve targeted penalties or liability judgments
against the specific actors who created and sold unsafe products (Bamberger and Guzman 2008).

New Directions in Domestic Regulatory Strategy
In the wake of the recent safety scares and scandals, both importing
and exporting countries stand at a crossroads. As the subsequent chapters in this book demonstrate, solving the import safety problem will
require new ideas. It will also require careful analysis by a broad range
of scholars from a variety of disciplines such as those represented in
this volume. Import safety is a regulatory problem as well as a trade
problem, a domestic problem as well as an international problem.
The range of solutions available to policy makers is a testament to
the size and scope of the import safety problem. A country might try to
improve its enforcement program by deploying limited resources more
effectively. Or it might try to improve outcomes by encouraging consumers themselves to take more care—and ensuring that they can do so
by requiring more and better labeling on products, highlighting their
risks, their origins, and their ingredients. Countries might improve
safety by turning away, to some degree, from border interdiction and
facilitated consumer self-help and turning instead toward improving
the government’s responsiveness when outbreaks of unsafe products
are identified. Probably no small part of the solution to import safety
problems will continue to be responsive and reactive in form—though
more effectively than at present—rather than purely preventive.
Effective policies will require smart, well-functioning regulatory institutions to carry them out. In the United States, this kind of institutional
support is widely thought to be hamstrung by the extensive patchwork
of agencies with overlapping and incomplete jurisdictions (GAO 2007;
O’Reilly 2004). Nearly a dozen different entities at the federal level bear
responsibility for food safety alone (GAO 2008a). General principles for
reorganization might include: (1) centralizing authority (e.g., the same
agency should inspect “the entire pizza,” not just the cheese under
neath the pepperoni); (2) establishing robust, shared databases and integrated communications systems in which multiple agencies must be
involved; and (3) separating organizational units that promote and subsidize industries from those that manage risks.
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However difficult to achieve, institutional reform may not be enough.
Hoffmann (2007: 15) argues that in the realm of food safety “incremental solutions like restoring funding, appointing a food safety czar, consolidating agencies, and even eliminating the ‘silos’ around regulation
of different food products, will not do the job.” Hoffmann, like others,
emphasizes the need for the implementation of Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems, through which companies essentially develop their own internal regulatory systems (Coglianese and
Lazer 2003). HACCP regulations require companies to identify the potential hazards associated with their processing operations and to identify methods for addressing these hazards. Companies must identify all
“critical control points” in their operations at which risks can be monitored and addressed, and then they must create internal plans and procedures for ensuring that risks can be minimized. Under an approach
like HACCP, any importer of food, drugs, or consumer products could
be required to develop its own plan for monitoring its suppliers and ensuring that any products sold within the importing nation meet that
country’s standards. Such a management-based approach holds much
promise for conditions like those that apply to imports, where product performance is costly for the government to measure and where
one-size-fits-all solutions do not apply (Bennear 2007; Coglianese and
Lazer 2003).
The sheer volume, heterogeneity, and changing nature of products
that pass through the global trade network make it virtually impossible
for the government to regulate products through more conventional
means. Thus, imposing mandates or otherwise encouraging importers
to develop their own private forms of regulation holds great appeal.
Of course, the same vastness and complexity that make it difficult for
governments to impose and enforce traditional regulatory standards
will also undoubtedly hamper to some extent efforts to ensure that
firms’ management systems are operating well and that other forms
of public-private partnerships are delivering substantive results rather
than just symbolism (Coglianese and Lazer 2003).

Toward a Global Consumer Protection System
That so many import safety responses are located at the international
level presents a paradox. Although imports can come from the other
side of the globe, the goal in any safety regime is to protect the most
local of experiences—the relationship between individuals and the
food they eat, the drugs that keep them healthy, and the products that
enrich their lives. Taking the very personal and making it multinational
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is hard enough as a matter of institutional design. But doing so without fostering alienation and discouraging the security of relationships
between people and what they consume may be especially daunting
(Esty 2006).
Managing the very local within the very global is what makes some
of the otherwise most promising international import safety ideas particularly challenging. In the United States, the possibility that personal
safety could be delegated to an international regime that would evolve
on its own to respond to new threats, with new tools of its own devising, has raised fears about the delegation of power and authority that
last held prominence when the Supreme Court gave the nondelegation
doctrine its one good year in the 1930s (A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States 1935; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 1935). Despite predictable fears and resistance to the delegation of regulatory authority
to international institutions, the creation of such institutions, or other
forms of international cooperation, either through formal treaty or
informal networking, would appear nevertheless inevitable. After all,
in a world of food scares, drug poisonings, and producers who do not
have to bear the cost of the injuries they inflict on the other side of the
world, certainly the marketplace by itself does not seem equipped to
handle the problem, and, as noted above, national governments cannot
hope to patrol all the goods entering their borders.
In developing regulatory responses to import safety problems, critical issues will also arise over how to manage the relationship between
the goal of global free trade and the safety demanded by domestic
publics. The WTO was designed to encourage freer trade among its
members (Nedzel 2008), but the imposition of domestic safety requirements on imported products would seem antithetical to the WTO’s raison d’être—even when such requirements are consistent with General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exceptions to the general
ban on barriers to free trade. How can the WTO reconcile its recognition that countries have legitimate differences in risk tolerance (WTO
2000–2001) with its emphasis on harmonizing regulatory standards so
as to facilitate international trade (WTO 1994)? Will it still be possible
for the WTO to accept local tastes on safety and health protections if
such protections must be based on common transnational standards of
scientific evidence and risk analysis, as the WTO also expects?
International solutions also need to take into account the various
steps in the causal chain leading to consumer harm. Where on that
chain should international efforts aim? Should they aim to stop dangerous products from being created in the first place, to identify unsafe
products before they reach the consumer, or both? Although interdiction at the borders would appear to be most compatible with a tra-
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ditional international system based on sovereignty, some promising
international institutions are starting to focus on prevention of unsafe
products at their source, even when doing so means crossing jurisdictional lines. The United Nations Technical Capacity Program, for example, is designed to develop the abilities of regulators in the developing
world (WHO 2003).
Other recognizably international solutions to the problems of import safety turn more on the prospect of using international resources
to enhance domestic responses to dangerous imports. For example, law
enforcement cooperation does not require international harmonization at all; it only facilitates the ability of government regulators to oversee the safety of foreign imports and to investigate injuries even if the
causal chain reaches across borders. The United States has avidly pursued this sort of cooperation with China, concluding food, drug, medical device, and animal feed agreements with Chinese regulators in the
past decade or so (HHS 2007b). Importing nations have also sought to
build capacity among the regulators of exports in other similar jurisdictions. For example, the FDA has made efforts to educate foreign food
regulators on food safety, again with particular attention paid to China
(Fan 2008).
International networks exemplify an increasingly salient approach in
which domestic regulators play the central role (Slaughter 2005). Regulatory networks of varying types are now being put to the task of regulating import risks, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission
(an international organization that has become the authorized entity
for global food safety standards) and the International Consumer Product Safety Caucus (a transnational organization comprising representatives from domestic regulatory agencies) (DeWaal and Brito 2005).
These networks, and other forms of soft law and so-called new governance strategies, all raise advantages and disadvantages that merit full
consideration in addressing import safety (Abbott and Snidal 2006).
The various international strategies for addressing consumer protection in a globalized economy raise at least three major sets of questions. The first set focuses on efficacy. How effective are the varied
strategies and under what conditions? When should international hard
or binding law, and even the creation of supranational institutions, be
deployed? When should soft, nonbinding law, or more collaborative
forms of governance, be pursued? When are domestic responses more
effective than international responses, and vice versa?
The second set of questions focuses on equity. There are, after all,
winners and losers to all domestic and international solutions. Who
benefits? And who suffers? How should the demands of the developed
world be reconciled with the realities of the developing world? Is it mor-

16     Cary Coglianese, Adam M. Finkel, and David Zaring

ally just to have the costs of new regulation imposed disproportionately
on those who are already struggling in order to reap benefits for consumers in the wealthiest parts of the world? As the global exchange of
goods continues to gather momentum, these sorts of questions will only
continue to arise.
The final set of questions focuses on accountability. Who exactly are
the publics to be served by any international import safety regime? Is it
the public in exporting countries, the public in importing countries, or
both? How are all of their voices to be heard or represented in the process of setting and enforcing international standards? Solving the market failures inherent in import safety will only give rise to worries about
creating failures in democratic governance.

Framing the Discussion
To begin to answer these questions, this book is organized into four sections, followed by a concluding chapter. In the first section, the chapters
provide broad perspectives on the origins, scale, and attributes of the
import safety issue. Following this introductory chapter, Jacques deLisle
puts China under the microscope. Using his extensive knowledge of
that country to shed light on the origins of many recent unsafe imports,
deLisle reveals the challenges China’s trade partners face in trying to
ensure a flow of safe products from that global economic powerhouse.
Moving from a focus on the exporters to a focus on the importers, Jonathan Baron examines the import safety issue from the perspective of
the consumers in one major importing country, the United States. As
well-publicized lapses in import safety sensitize consumers to the possible dangers of products they buy, Baron’s survey research on consumer
attitudes reveals that Americans are not terribly parochial about unsafe
products—they do not like them whether they are made abroad or in
the United States. However, when unsafe imports emerge, the American public has a tendency to hold U.S. government officials responsible
for the failures of private actors.
The second section of the book examines international trade and its
governing institutions as possible venues for—or constraints on—the
improvement of import safety. Tracey Epps and Michael Trebilcock emphasize the benefits of the current rules-based system of international
trade and the constraints it places on developing innovative solutions
to consumer protection. The next two chapters complement the EppsTrebilcock analysis. Tim Büthe provides a detailed, analytic account
of the development of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, suggesting that international standards emerging from a majority-vote process
may not preserve the best features of the scientific, economic, and polit-
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ical inputs to those discussions. Kevin Outterson suggests the possibility
that international intellectual-property standards concerning counterfeit drugs are motivated less by a concern for safety, as often stated,
and more by regulatory capture— a general concern for any international regulatory governance regime, just as with domestic regulatory
institutions. In the case Outterson considers, ensuring that intellectual
property rules do not prevent affordable access to needed drugs in the
developing world is itself, he argues, a matter of “importing safety.”
The third section of the book develops ideas for smarter government
use of data-collection, standard-setting, and enforcement resources to
prevent untoward harms from imported products and to respond more
effectively to incipient problems that escape preventive intervention.
Richard Berk explores the concept of data-driven forecasting, which
can lead agencies to deploy enforcement resources where they will most
likely detect nascent problems. Lorna Zach and Vicki Bier argue for
greater reliance on the modern methods of quantitative risk assessment to improve priority-setting in the selection of competing targets
for regulatory intervention and to help firms control their own production processes and improve the safety of their products. Writing from
the perspective of the European Union, Alberto Alemanno argues that,
when properly designed, a reactive system of dissemination of information about product hazards can yield several advantages over a proactive approach, especially when the comparison is appropriately sober
about the limited prospects for truly preventing most problems before
they emerge into commerce.
Finally, the fourth section introduces three innovative proposals for
harnessing market power and incentives to drive improved product
safety. Kenneth Bamberger and Andrew Guzman propose augmenting
liability rules to force the domestic firms that benefit from foreign production and low-cost imports to internalize the domestic costs of their
activity. Tom Baker develops the concept of bonded safety warranties,
wherein importers enter into contracts with insurance companies to
compensate consumers if their products fail to meet established health
and safety standards, and he then explores the incentives such a system
would create to avoid breaches of these warranties. Errol Meidinger
evaluates the prospects for the devolution of some regulatory responsibility for product safety onto manufacturers and third-party certification, scientific, and auditing bodies.
In the conclusion, David Zaring and Cary Coglianese suggest that the
complex response to the challenges of safe imports can be thought of as
the difficult but rewarding task of creating a regime of delegated governance. By this they mean a global system that, in the aggregate, pursues
consumer protection by combining targeted public action with private
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inspections, public and private standard-setting, and a degree of dependence on consumers to take some responsibility for their own safety.
Together the chapters in this book tackle the problem of unsafe imports from several directions: analyzing its sources and causes, evaluating both government and private-sector actions needed to address it,
and considering the constraints under which such solutions must be implemented. Given the complexity of global systems of production, shipment, and sale of consumer goods, domestic governments and private
firms will continue to be called on to prevent, interdict, and respond to
hazardous imports, whether they are contaminated foodstuffs, unsafe
pharmaceuticals, or consumer products with hidden dangers. Ensuring safe imports in an era of globalization will undoubtedly strain traditional domestic regulatory entities. As such, the challenges of the global
society require the kind of research analysis—and new ideas about regulation, information dissemination, and policy reform—that are represented in the pages of this book.
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